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BOOK REVIEWS
such objections as that it would be impossible to devise appropriate
standards of decision, that setting such standards (i.e. fixing wages)
would tend to lead to a managed economy (i.e. fixing prices), that it
would discourage, if not destroy, free collective bargaining.
PAUL R. HAYSt

DEFENSE WITHOUT INFLATION.

The Twentieth Century Fund.

1951.

By Albert G. Hart.* New York:
Pp. xiv, 186. $2.00.

Under the respected imprimatur of the Twentieth Century Fund,
Professor Hart has prepared this conspectus of the battle against inflation. On the basis of his survey, the Fund's Committee on Economic
Stabilization, -consisting of Professors Clark, Schultz, Smithies and
Wallace, have briefly summarized their views on the problem. Generally,
they agree with the prescriptions of Professor Hart.
It is good to know that, amidst the weltering confusion of special
pleas, self-serving briefs and nutty nostrums, men of learning, experience, wisdom and common sense are brooding upon vital issues and
affording us the benefit of their cerebrations. One might wish that to
them had been added an economic journalist with, shall we say, the
gifts of Stuart Chase. This volume, far too sketchy for the purposes
of the professional scholar, is designed, presumably, for the eye and mind
of the citizen seeking enlightenment. But such a citizen, for all his good
purposes, finds it hard going when five professionals gang up on him.
However, even one who is patently no intellectual may derive benefit
from this little chart through the perilous paths of partial mobilization.
Such a one will find here a healthful antidote to the monolithic creeds
being preached in so many economic quarters by the right-wing counterparts of the radical money bugs who abounded on the fringes of the left
during the depression days.
Professor Hart and his colleagues do not, of course, minimize the
role of fiscal and monetary measures in stabilizing the economy. On the
contrary, they argue that control over the money supply is even more
essential during a long-pull partial mobilization of "readiness" which
may last for a decade, than during a more temporary season of all-out
war.
The choice, as Professor Hart describes it in terms of "equilibrium,"
"mild disequilibrium," or "severe disequilibrium," is whether to try for
t Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. * Professor of Economics, Columbia University.
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upstream on, downstream control of the inflationary flood. Upstream
contiol aims at choking off the supply of money and credit. Thus the
flood is caught nearer the source. Downstream control aims at damming
the flood, after it has gained momentum, by means of direct controls
which leave the money supply relatively unaffected: price ceilings, rationing and allocation of scarce supplies, and wage stabilization.
Although Professor Hart is somewhat squeamish about dealing with
the politics of inflation, it is likely that in a democracy such as ours the
plans emerging from the'process of pull and haul will, like the measures
hitherto adopted for controlling floods in the Missouri Valley, borrow
something from both systems, and not necessarily the best. Certainly
the advocates of a single, simon pure, theological approach will derive no
comfort from this volume.
During World War II, as Professor Hart points out, we allowed
a severe disequilibrium to develop. That is to say, we allowed the money
supply to increase by leaps and bounds, relying primarily upon direct
controls to hold the line against inflation. The results were more successful than one might expect: from the passage of the Stabilization Act in
October, 1942, until the fighting stopped, the line held. This was despite
the fact that Congress refused to impose the taxes requested by President
Roosevelt, and only 40% of the cost of the war was paid out of current
taxation. Furthermore, the Treasury, and under Treasury prodding, the
Federal Reserve Board, adhered to the same cheap money policies which
had been adopted during the depression as weapons against deflation.
As Professor Hart makes clear, the direct control, or disequilibrium
policy is not only capable under certain conditions of repressing inflation,
but also contributes a certain positive force to the mobilization effort.
These advantages were, even during World War II, obtained only at
the price of a severe post-war inflation. It was a policy of postponement
rather than containment. In a period of "readiness" mobilization, the
disadvantages are more likely to be present, and the advantages less
obvious.
Therefore, both Professor Hart and the Twentieth Century Fund's
Committee advocate severe restraints on the expansion of money supply.
Such restraint, they believe, would be the greatest possible contribution
to stabilizing the national economy. Such a prescription calls for restraint upon consumer credit in the housing and other durable fields;
not only as a means of combatting monetary inflation, but as a substitute
for crude and ineffective rationing schemes in fields of specific scarcity.
It calls also for a reversal of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve
Board-a reversal at least partially achieved between the writing and
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printing of this volume. Certainly, as the Committe puts it, we cannot
stabilize the economy by pegging the price of government bonds if it
means letting all other prices go- through the roof.
Most important of all, Professor Hart and his colleagues prescribe
a drastic increase in taxes-about three times as great as the increase
recently voted by the Congress. Budget "economies," while given the
.usual pat on the back, obviously do not excite these authors as a source
of great anti-inflationary strength. The desired revenues can be obtained,
says Professor Hart, by increasing the rates of existing taxes, income,
corporate and excise, and without resorting to new imposts such as a
federal sales tax. Though the author advocates strongly the maintenance
of traditional incentives as a source of efficiency and flexibility during
the "readiness" period, he apparently has no fears for the economy's
virility under such a fiscal regimen. However, he does have reservations
as to the advisability of drastic taxes on excess profits, preferring personal and excise taxes as the chief source of new revenues.
While emphasizing fiscal and monetary measures as the principal
items on our anti-inflationary agenda, Professor Hart and his reviewing
Committee do not join forces with the monetary extremists of the HayekHazlitt school: to whom all direct controls are anathema and the maintenance of the free market a fetish. Rather, the authors recognize what
is too often overlooked: that many direct controls have their origin in
the requirements of mobilization rather than stabilization. The government must make sure that those who supply it with munitions and other
sinews have what they need when they need it. The orderly withdrawal
of resources from the civilian market necessitates a considerable measure
of direct control. The maintenance of a healthy and productive civilian
economy necessitates additional measures lest a mad scramble for what is
left disrupt the entire scheme of mobilization.
This may not be obvious to those whose acquaintance with mobilization economics has been largely by way of seminar and retreat, but it is
obvious to the authors of this little book, as it is to anyone who has
dealt with these vexing matters first-hand.
From direct controls as an aid to mobilization, it is only a step to
selective controls as a weapon in the anti-inflationary armory. In time
of all-out mobilization for war, when achievement of monetary equilibrium is virtually impossible, general controls on a wide front are
inevitable. Even then their efficacy can be sustained only by patriotic
sentiment, and a fervent hope that the hardships of war are drawing to
an undated but certain conclusion. In time of "readiness" mobilization,
general controls of a direct nature must of necessity partake of a stop-gap
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character; there are simply too many political and psychological obstacles
in the way.
On the other hand, Professor Hart and his colleagues believe that
a substantial number of direct controls are required to supplement the
inevitable deficiencies of fiscal and monetary measures in combating inflation during a long period of partial mobilization. This is particularly
necessary during the "hump" period of rapid capital formation.
One other familiar fallacy gets a deserved coup de grace in these
pages. That is the musty old adage that "the only way to lick inflation
is to increase production." Professor Hart has found more answers to
this one than a Congressman has amendments to a price control bill.
Increased production generates increased income, and therefore approaches economic neutrality. Ordinarily production cannot be increased
without taking manpower and materials out of the already restricted
civilian market, thereby at least temporarily aggravating the inflationary
pressures.
Professor Hart does, however, recognize what appears to this
reviewer the wisest single decision made during the mobilization period:
Mr. Charles E. Wilson's determination to anticipate the long pull of
partial mobilization by deliberately increasing the productive capacity of
the national economy approximately 25%. By this imaginative foresight, we are assured an over-all economic capacity sufficient to meet the
needs of mobilization and at the same time maintain and expand the
civilian standard of living. The temporary hardships incident to this
policy will pay ample dividends.
From this brief survey, the reader may gather that it is the
reviewer's intention to commend this volume of Professor Hart's. Such
a deduction would be correct. It would be hard to find, among academic
pronouncements, a more balanced, a more thoughtful a more disinterested
or a less tendentious treatment of such a mooted set of issues.
At the same time, this reviewer must pick a few flaws lest he contribute to the demise of a noble profession.
For a book of less than 200 pages, too much space is devoted to
the collateral problems of mobilization and not enough to the specific
problems of stabilization itself. While the views of the author on such
matters as the likelihood of Russian attack in Europe and the desirable
level for our armed forces to reach during the next two years may be
interesting, it is questionable whether they possess enough intrinsic
authority to merit inclusion here at the expense of other matters, such as
the techniques of price control and wage stabilization during a period of
"readiness."
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Indeed, in this field, one whose experience and approach are perhaps all too practical may feel that the author and the Committee alike
have let him down a bit. One reads the volume and discerns clearly.
that Professor Hart and his academic senate believe that some wage
and price controls are desirable, but not too many; that a general freeze
of prices and wages may be temporarily required, but cannot last long.
Apart from these truly 'Valuable and well-supported conclusions, the citizen and the public official alike will search in vain for principles to guide
him on his rocky road.
This contrasts strikingly with the detailed treatment afforded to
fiscal and monetary matters, even to charts of projected revenue yields.
Yet, it is in the application and functioning of control mechanisms that
guidance is most needed. Previous experience in this field is likely to
afford the least reliable indications as to the proper courses of action
today.
Even so, some judgments are pronounced, albeit hesitatingly, by
Professor Hart rather than by the collective mind at the end of the book.
(This method of treatment, incidentally, may be regarded as a variation
of the old elementary school textbook with its "answers in the back of
the book.") After carefully weighing the pros -and cons, the author
concludes that escalator clauses, parity formulas, guaranteed profit margins, cost-plus contracts and the Schlicter variable bond, all must stand
condemned. The author is not unmindful of the purposes which such
devices sometimes serve, especially in the case of wage contracts, in
reconciling divergent or rebellious groups to the rigidities of a stabilization line. On balance, Professor Hart feels that such a "hold-the-line"
policy puts too many eggs in one basket, and in the all too likely event
that early efforts to find a defensible line do not avail, subsequent efforts
are less likely to succeed.
This was not the case with the "Little Steel" formula of World War
II, which followed upon earlier failures to hold the line with selective
controls, but which managed to survive, albeit in battered form, until
the fighting had ended. In one respect, however, the "Little Steel"
formula differed from the escalator clauses now sanctioned. It escalated
for past increases in the cost of living, but contained no guarantees for
the future; it was an escalator with terminal facilities. Doubtless its
survival was 'a tribute to the stiffening of price and rationing controls
which followed, and which succeeded in holding subsequent rises in living
costs to a few points in the index. Doubtless a steeper rise would have
knocked the caboose off the tr.in, but at any rate the formula worked.
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In some respects it is difficult to reconcile Professor Hart's adverse
judgment on escalator clauses with his frequently expressed belief that
direct controls in a period of partial mobilization must be more flexible
than in a total mobilization. Possibly the adverse judgment is confined
to the temporary period of a "freeze" during which presumably-but
not, in fact-tighter monetary and fiscal policies are to catch hold.
No policy which pretends to call itself stabilization can succeed if
every politically significant group is able to immunize itself completely
from the hardships and injustices which inevitably attend every effort
to establish a defensible price line. Professor Hart realizes this, and
that is his basic reason for condemning the "built-in" devices. On the
other hand, considerations of economic justice cannot be wholly ignored
even during mobilization crises, and escalator clauses do afford some
protection to the lower-income groups who suffer most from inflation.
In an effort to avoid the worst consequences of escalation and achieve
some of its social benefits, Professor Hart squints approvingly at the
so-called Canadian compromise, which permits escalation on a graduated
scale, with primary benefits for wage earners in the lowest brackets.
For escalation outside the wage contract, whether by way of parity,
or guaranteed profit markups, Professor Hart essays no defense.
One wishes, however, that either the author or his colleagues had
somewhere in their opus attempted to grasp the nettle of some specific
sector of the control program. My own candidate for such intensive
treatment would be meat. After years of dealing with difficult cases
involving the interstate transportation of liquor, the late Justice Brandeis
once sighed that the curse of the Supreme Court was whiskey. To anyone who bears the scars of price control in action, meat is, always was
and always will be the curse of price control. It is almost safe to say
that any control program which can control meat can control anything.
Yet, save for an offhand Committee reference to rationing, there is little
here about meat. To some at least, this seems like "Hamlet" without
Hamlet and my personal acquaintance with most of these estimable
gentlemen is the basis for the conclusion that they are not all vegetarians.
Yet it seems churlist to complain because economists are not political magicians. Meat, like so many of the white-hot issues of stabilization policy, is more a political than an economic problem. It is, of course,
not easy to formulate a program which will command the assent of men
qualified to judge. Nevertheless, this volume is enough to demonstrate
that it might be done.
But to persuade, cajole, threaten and scare the contending and
suspicious economic groups, and the solons who think they can divine
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the whims and caprices of them all, into effectuating the agreed-upon
policy is another matter. The efforts to maintain some degree of stability
during the reconversion period after World War II, for example, simply
fell apart under the fierce and almost hysterical pressure of internecine
economic warfare. The result was not only to belie every prediction
made by those responsible for premature dismantling of the control mAchinery, particularly as to the stability of the price level and the volume
of production; but, as Professor Hart is so acutely aware, to make the
task of our present administrators infinitely more difficult. ,
Here is a field of study almost unexplored, and one which should
commend itself to the splendid public spirit of the Twentieth Century
Fund. Not merely in fighting inflation but in the effectuation of all
economic policies, the rock upon which democratic government seems
most likely to flounder is the rock of divisive pressure politics. How can
we keep government responsive to the demands of popular opinion 'and
at the same time make it possible for public servants to legislate and
administer in an unbadgered and rational atmosphere? Such a challenge
offers the Fund opportunity for an effort worthy to rank with the study
which Professor Hart and his associates have completed with such
distinction.
PAUL A. PORTER.A

JURISPRUDENCE: ITS AMERICAN PROPHETS. By Harold Gill
Reuschlein.* Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1951. Pp.
xvii, 527. $7.50.
With the appearance of this book, a much needed tool of jurisprudential instruction has at long last been supplied. Here, all the
divergent views so well known among legal scholars are brought together
in such a way as to emphasize the most favorable points of each. This
method of presentation, it will be noted, differs radically from the practices of most of those about whom Professor Reuschlein is writing.
Many jurists, in emphasizing their own contributions, all too often deemphasize thie virtues and stress the defects of competing philosophies.
Despite the favorable treatment here accorded by the author, the clashes
are obvious for one to find; but the juristic fights are not held out on the
stage with the author finding personal zest in the conflicts.
The subtitle of the book fairly describes its actual content. So
comprehensive is the coverage that the views of both the third and fourtht
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